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ABSTRACT
Economic and political developments affect religiosity, and the extent of religious participation
and beliefs influence economic performance and political institutions.  We study these two directions of
causation in a broad cross-country panel that includes survey information over the last 20 years on church
attendance and an array of religious beliefs.  Although religiosity declines overall with economic
development, the nature of the response varies with the dimension of development.  Church attendance
and religious beliefs are positively related to education (thereby conflicting with theories in which religion
reflects non-scientific thinking) and negatively related to urbanization.  Attendance also declines with
higher life expectancy and lower fertility.  We investigate the effects of official state religions,
government regulation of the religion market, Communism, religious pluralism, and the denominational
composition of religious adherence.  On the other side, we find that economic growth responds positively
to the extent of some religious beliefs but negatively to church attendance.  That is, growth depends on
the extent of believing relative to belonging.  These results hold up when we use as instrumental variables
the measures of official state religion, government regulation, and religious pluralism.
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Interactions between religion and political economy involve two directions of 
causation.  On one side, a nation’s economic and political developments affect its levels 
of religiosity.  In this view, the dependent or endogenous variables are the extent of 
individual religious participation and beliefs and the role of organized religion in a 
country’s political, legal, and social structure.  On the other side, the nature and extent of 
religiousness influence economic performance and the nature of political, legal, and 
social institutions.  From this perspective, religious activities and beliefs are the 
independent or exogenous variables. 
 
I.  Religion as the Dependent Variable 
A.  Secularization and Related Hypotheses 
The secularization hypothesis is a prominent idea in theories that view religion as 
endogenous.
1  In this analysis, economic development causes individuals to become less 
religious, as measured by church attendance and religious beliefs.  The beliefs may refer 
to God, an after-life, heaven, hell, and so on, or may just refer to tendencies of people to 
characterize themselves as religious.  The secularization hypothesis also encompasses the 
idea that economic development causes organized religion to play a lesser role in political 
decision-making and in social and legal processes more generally.
2  One manifestation of 
this force is a tendency for official state churches to be abandoned as countries develop.  
As examples, countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Japan, and South Korea dropped their 
                                                 
1 The hypothesis can be viewed as one component of modernization theory, in which economic 
development leads systematically to an array of changes in social and political institutions.  Modernization 
theory, as discussed in Bell (1973) and Inglehart and Baker (2000), relates to the economic determinism of 
Karl Marx; see, for example, Marx (1913, pp. 11-12).  The secularization hypothesis itself dates back at 
least to Weber (1930).  For more recent discussions, see Wilson (1966), Berger (1967), and Martin (1978). 
2 This idea appears in Weber (1930) and has been extended in Wilson (1966), Berger (1967), and Chaves 
(1994).  2
established state churches many years ago.  The secularization hypothesis remains 
controversial, and an important aspect of the present study is to assess its empirical 
validity in modern data.
3 
Economic development typically encompasses an array of changes, which include 
increases in per capita income, education, life expectancy, and urbanization; reductions in 
fertility; and changes in age structure.  The predicted effect on religiosity depends on the 
particular aspect of economic development.  Hence, it is important in theoretical and 
empirical treatments to distinguish among these aspects. 
Consider first increased education.  One argument for the secularization 
hypothesis is that more educated people are more scientific and are, therefore, more 
inclined to reject beliefs that reflect mainly superstition and reliance on super-natural 
forces.  In particular, if religious beliefs are based primarily on ignorance, then more 
educated persons would tend to be less religious.  This viewpoint accords with Hume 
(1757, pp. 182-83), who argued that religion derived from irrational human fears and 
anxieties.  He viewed religion as a mechanism for people to ward off forces that they 
could not rationally explain.  According to this view, increased education should be 
accompanied by reductions in church attendance and in an array of religious beliefs. 
A contrary argument is that religious beliefs are fundamentally non-verifiable 
and, therefore, require a considerable degree of abstraction or “faith.”  Scientific 
analysis—and theoretical reasoning generally—also require a capacity for abstraction.  If 
more educated persons are more capable of the abstractions needed to think scientifically, 
then they may also be more able or willing to make the abstractions needed to support 
                                                 
3 For discussions of evidence contrary to the hypothesis, see, for example, Finke and Stark (1992) and 
Iannaccone and Stark (1994).   3
religious beliefs.  Therefore, from this perspective, more educated persons might be more 
religious.
4  See Iannaccone, Stark, and Finke (1998) for further argument against Hume’s 
linking of religion and irrationality. 
Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) provide a different reason for why increased 
education would spur church attendance.  They argue that education increases the returns 
from networks and other forms of social capital.  Hence, they predict that more educated 
persons would participate more in various group activities, including church services.  
However, in this approach, church attendance bears no special relation to religious 
beliefs—this attendance is modeled as just one of many ways to build social capital.  In 
this analysis, there is no clear relation between education and the extent of religious 
beliefs, except to the extent that more frequent church attendance instilled greater beliefs.   
Models that focus on the role of salvation and the after-life,
5 such as Azzi and 
Ehrenberg (1975) and Glaeser and Glendon (1998), predict that people would become 
more religious as they age and, hence, get closer to death.  Similarly, for a given age, the 
prediction is that religiousness would be higher the lower is one’s life expectancy.  These 
conclusions follow if salvation depends on cumulated religious effort, including church 
attendance and prayer, during one’s lifetime.  In this case, because of discounting of 
future expenditures, it would be desirable to postpone “outlays” until later in life.   
The arguments about age and life expectancy are stronger if salvation relates 
especially to activities toward the end of life—as seems to be true under Catholic 
                                                 
4 We are grateful to Greg Mankiw for suggesting this argument. 
5 In religions outside of Judaism-Christianity-Islam, the role of an after-life is less clear.  For example, 
Hinduism does not have an after-life or heaven, per se, but does allow for reincarnation and the potential to 
reach eventually a state of perfection or enlightenment or nirvana.  In terms of incentives, the potential for 
achieving nirvana can play a role analogous to that of an after-life.  Buddhism is, in many respects, similar 
to Hinduism, but without the reliance on reincarnation.  For further discussion, see McCleary (2002).  4
doctrine, which allows for a continual cycle of sinning and absolution.
6  In this system, 
people have an incentive to accumulate sins early in life and then make up for them as 
they get closer to death.  Weber (1930) argued that this pattern would not tend to 
emerge—or, at least, would be attenuated—under some forms of Protestantism.  In 
particular, the Calvinist view posits daily moral conduct throughout one’s life as the only 
means of ensuring God’s grace—or, at least, of providing a sign that one has been 
chosen.
7   
The Muslim religion is, in some respects, similar to the Catholic religion in that 
redemption is possible at any time, even in Purgatory, by attaining belief in Allah and 
otherwise ascribing to the Five Pillars of Islam.  Thus, an older person—even one that 
has already been condemned—can always rise above past sins.  Hence, this doctrine 
seems also to motivate devout behavior especially at advanced ages. 
Under the Buddhist faith, a person is continually searching for knowledge to 
acquire enlightenment and, therefore, has no incentive to defer religious investments.  
Hinduism—out of which Buddhism originated—is less clear-cut, because lay persons are 
supposed to focus their pursuit of individual salvation in the last stage of their lives.  
However, earlier stages entail religious obligations that contribute indirectly to a person’s 
ultimate enlightenment and, hence, salvation.   
Economic reasoning implies that anything that raises the cost of religious 
activities would, ceteris paribus, reduce these activities.  For example, economic 
                                                 
6 A recent example is the Pope’s unwillingness to adopt a zero-tolerance policy for pedophile priests.  
Apparently, the Pope wanted to maintain the potential for absolution for past sinners.  Another example is 
the old Catholic practice of selling dispensations to sinners.  Luther’s dissatisfaction with the corruption of 
this regime was an important force behind the Protestant Reformation.  See Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison 
(2001)  for an economic analysis of the Reformation. 
7 According to Weber (1930, p. 117), “The God of Calvin demanded of his believers not single good 
works, but a life of good works combined in a unified system.  There was no place for the very human 
Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin.”  5
development raises the value of time, measured by market wage rates and per capita 
incomes.  On this ground, development implies a rising opportunity cost of participating 
in organized religion, which encompasses church services, retreats, and pilgrimages.  The 
cost of time spent at informal religious activities, such as prayer at home, would also rise.  
Hence, the prediction is that economic development would reduce church attendance, as 
well as the time allocated to prayer and other religious activities. 
This conclusion applies with lesser force to persons who are out of the labor 
force, such as retired persons.  Historically in developed countries and even today in 
many developing countries, women are also typically not in the labor market.  Therefore, 
women would tend to attend church more frequently than men.  An increase in labor-
force participation, notably of women, would be predicted to reduce church attendance 
and other religious activities. 
The argument about the increasing value of time assumes that the enhanced 
productivity that applies generally in the economy (as signaled by rising wage rates) is 
not accompanied by a similar productivity gain for the time spent in church or at prayer.  
The usual assumption is that churchgoing and other aspects of religious participation are 
intensive in time and are, therefore, not subject to the usual productivity advances 
associated with technological progress and increases in physical capital.  A question, 
however, is whether the improvements in human capital due to rising education would 
somehow also make the time spent on religion correspondingly more productive. 
Aging can also affect the cost of churchgoing, especially for the sick and elderly.  
On this ground, the prediction is that people who are ill or very old would attend church 
relatively little and, perhaps, engage in relatively more prayer at home.  These effects  6
offset the influences mentioned before about a person’s response to being relatively close 
to death.  However, despite the relatively low rates of church attendance, the sick and 
elderly may hold strong religious beliefs, that is, they may invest heavily in personal 
“spiritual capital.” 
Children would tend to attend church relatively often because their costs of 
attendance are comparatively low.  This effect is reinforced because the productivity of 
attendance—in the sense of the beliefs engendered through “indoctrination”—is likely to 
be high at young, formative ages.  (However, this perspective on the productivity of 
religious investment may apply more to parents than to the children themselves.)  This 
effect offsets the regular age influence discussed earlier.  Moreover, the incentive to bring 
children to church tends to induce greater church attendance of adults, who are likely to 
want to participate in the process of inculcating their children. 
Urbanization is another aspect of economic development that has been argued to 
have a substantial negative effect on religiosity.  One reason is that urban areas offer an 
array of competing social activities, such as museums, theatres, and political 
organizations, which compete with church participation.  A possible explanation for this 
urban/rural pattern of social amenities is that economies of scale are important for 
museums, etc., but are less significant for the erection and staffing of churches.  That is, 
even sparsely populated rural towns can sustain a local congregation.   
Another argument is that rural areas are dominated by agriculture, which is 
especially prone to the uncertainties of nature.  Greater church attendance in rural areas 
may then reflect a greater demand for religion as a way to cope with these uncertainties.    7
  Wilson (1966) and Berger (1967), picking up on an argument from Weber (1930), 
argued that economic development leads to the secularization not only of individuals but 
also of political and social institutions, including the churches themselves.  On the 
political level, organized religions would be predicted to play a smaller role in 
governance and legislation.  Notably, official state churches would become less frequent, 
and separation between church and state would become more common.  Organized 
religion would be predicted to have a decreasing influence over regulations involving 
such matters as economic regulation, marriage, divorce, birth control, abortion, and 
euthanasia.  Church services would be predicted to become less demanding, for example, 
by abandoning the use of a “foreign” language, requiring smaller outlays of time by 
participants, reducing elaborate rituals, and requiring less stringent practices by 
adherents.  Part of this process, according to Weber (1930) and Troeltsch (1931), is that 
religious sects—at least successful ones—tend to become less other-worldly and more 
like the established denominations.   
   
  B.  Pluralization and Religious Competition 
  Another argument by secularization theorists is that religiosity would be fostered 
by the existence in a country of a monopoly provider of religion, for example, by the 
presence of an established state church.  If competition existed among churches, then the 
argument is that much of this competition would take the form of debunking the religious 
beliefs or myths that were practiced by other groups.  If the beliefs were based primarily 
on superstition and ignorance, then the conclusion is that these beliefs could not 
withstand the competition.  Hence, according to this view, the demise of official state  8
churches—predicted to be a part of the secularization process—would tend to foster the 
decline in individual church attendance and beliefs.  Some of this argument appears in 
Smith (1791, Book V, Article III) and is attributed partly to Hume (1757).   
However, Smith also notes that monopoly providers of religious services tend—as 
monopolies do generally—to become non-innovative and indolent.  He particularly 
observed this behavior in the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England.  
Specifically, he argued that the behavior of state religions reflected the lack of strong 
connection between financial support and the provision of good service to “customers.”  
In response, state religions tended to devolve, losing the aspects of religious devotion that 
are relevant to people practicing their faith and the authority of its doctrine.  Moreover, 
state religions tended to become a religion for elites, and—to the extent that the clergy 
itself became an elite group—of elites.  Consequently, instead of focusing on the 
religious needs of their congregants, the clergy tended to engage in secular activities, 
including politics and the arts, and to intellectual learning.  In other words, having 
reached a level of affluence and a substantial degree of disconnection between income 
and service quality, the clergy were not very motivated to provide a high level of 
customer satisfaction. 
In contrast, religious denominations that depend on customer contributions must 
continually address the needs of congregants to stay in business.  Hence, new religious 
movements or “upstarts,” such as the Lutherans and Calvinists during the Reformation in 
Switzerland and Germany, the Methodists and Quakers in 18
th century England, and 
evangelical Protestants today in the United States, Latin America, and Asia, are able to 
enter the religion market by providing better service to members.  In response, the  9
established state religions have sometimes resorted to coercion, repression, and even 
violence to maintain their financial, political, and social arrangements.  The Inquisition in 
Spain in the late 1500s is an extreme example of this response. 
Religion, Smith argued, is more vibrant where there is a disassociation between 
church and state.  The absence of state religion creates a climate for competition among 
religion providers (Smith [1791, Book V, Article III]).  By showing no preference for a 
particular religion, but rather permitting any religion to be freely practiced, Smith argued 
that the state would create an open market in which rational discourse among religious 
groups would generate a public display of “good temper and moderation.”  In an open 
religion market, Smith predicted a continual subdividing of sects so that a pluralistic 
structure would naturally emerge in which no single religion dominated.  He also 
contended that, where there is state support for a religious monopoly or for an oligopoly 
among religions, one will find zealousness and the imposition of ideas on a public that 
lacks choices.  In contrast, where there is an open market for religion, his prediction was 
that one would find moderation and reason. 
Jeremy (1988, 1998) modified the Smithian view by arguing that the relaxation of 
state regulation of religion could unleash competitive forces in the economic marketplace 
even if the upstart religions did not achieve large increases in membership.  The focus of 
this argument lies with the legal recognition of non-conformist Protestant denominations 
during the 1700s in England (see Worsley [1816], Ashton [1924], and Hagen [1962]).  
Part of the appeal of these groups was that they offered a different vision of the link 
between salvation and economic activity.  Although these groups did not become near  10
dominant in the religion market in terms of membership, they did come to dominate 
certain sectors of the economy, notably those associated with entrepreneurship. 
The Smithian perspective on religious competition has been used by Stark and 
Bainbridge (1987), Finke and Stark (1992), Iannaccone (1991), and Finke and 
Iannaccone (1993) to develop a “market” or “supply-side” model of religious 
participation.  Their argument is that greater religious pluralism—measured, for example, 
by an index of the diversity of religious denominations that exist in a country or region—
tends to promote better service and, hence, encourages religious participation.
8  
Moreover, the presence of an established state church—notably in Scandinavian 
countries—is viewed as the typical source of a low degree of religious pluralism and, 
hence, of low participation in organized religion.  However, the connection between 
pluralism and religious beliefs would be expected to be weaker than that between 
pluralism and church attendance.  That is, individuals may sustain a high degree of 
religious beliefs even if they rely less on the support from organized religion. 
Chaves and Cann (1992) extended the supply-side argument by using empirical 
measures of the extent of state involvement and interference with church activities.  For 
example, greater state regulation of religion—which Chaves and Cann measured by, 
among other things, whether the government appoints or approves church leaders—was 
argued to decrease the efficiency of religion providers and, hence, to generate lower rates 
of church attendance.  However, state religion also typically includes forms of subsidy, 
such as payments to church employees and the collection of taxes dedicated to church 
uses.  An economic perspective implies that these subsidies would encourage formal 
religious activity.  Thus, despite Smith’s eloquent thoughts on the evils of government 
                                                 
8 For a critical survey of this work, see Chaves and Gorski (2001).  11
supported monopoly, the overall impact of an official state church on religious 
participation could well be positive. 
Governments can also suppress religion, either specific ones or in general.  For 
example, Communist countries, such as the Soviet Union and China, tried hard to 
eradicate organized religion.  A likely reason is that organized religion was regarded as 
competitive with the Communist quasi-religion.  From an empirical perspective, it is 
therefore interesting to examine not only the impact of Communism on church attendance 
and religious beliefs, but also the changes that have occurred since the elimination of 
Communism in many countries in the 1990s. 
 
II.  Religion as the Independent Variable 
A.  Effects on Economic Development 
Weber’s (1930) principal thesis is that religion can be an important positive or 
negative force on economic development.  He stressed that the stimulus to economic 
growth would be positive if religion looked favorably on the accumulation of material 
wealth, perhaps in conjunction with rewards obtained in an after-life.  Weber found this 
favorable element especially in the Calvinist Protestantism that arose in parts of Western 
Europe during the Reformation.
9  Notably, a life of good works, reflected in material 
success, was viewed as the only way to attain some epistemological certainty of having 
                                                 
9 Weber’s analysis focuses on the causal link from religious doctrine to the incentives for economic 
performance.  Tawney’s (1926) suggestion is that the economically favorable beliefs contained in some 
forms of Protestantism may have been a response to the rise of capitalism.  In this view, the causal arrow 
points from economic performance to religious beliefs, as well as in the opposite direction.  Tawney also 
argued that a general decline of religious authority would help to make acceptable the acquisition of wealth 
and, thereby, promote economic growth.  Troeltsch (1931, pp. 34-36) argued that religions that would 
support economic progress were those based on reason and rational activity, which he particularly found in 
Calvinist Protestantism.  He contrasted these denominations with others, such as Lutheranism, that were 
founded on “imagination and simplicity of feeling with a non-reflective habit of mind, a primitive energy, 
and an urgent sense of need.”  12
received God’s Grace.
10  However, Weber also predicted that, once capitalistic modes of 
labor and production were firmly established, the relationship between religion and 
economic activity would weaken.  He argued that the Protestant ethic would become 
embodied in general ethical codes and social and legal institutions and would, therefore, 
no longer depend on specific forms of religious practices and beliefs.
11  Thus, Weber 
would not predict a close association in modern data between religious affiliations or 
practices and economic outcomes. 
Another line of argument involves the moral codes advocated by some religious 
doctrines.  Religion can encourage economic development by promoting a positive 
attitude toward honesty.  Notably, religion may increase levels of trust and reduce levels 
of corruption and criminal activity.  In this connection, Lipset and Lenz (2000) argue 
empirically that Protestant countries are less corrupt than Catholic ones.  Stulz and 
Williamson (2001) find that Protestant countries provide greater legal protection than 
Catholic countries for creditors, although not for shareholders.  Protestant countries also 
seem to be better in various dimensions of the rule of law, including the efficiency of the 
judiciary.  However, probably because of limited data, Stulz and Williamson do not reach 
clear conclusions about the differences between Christian and non-Christian countries. 
Religion may also influence a country’s openness to strangers and, hence, the 
propensity to interact with outsiders in domestic or international business.  For example, 
                                                 
10 More generally, Weber focused on the connection between an individual’s belief in salvation and the 
incentives for that individual to attain material success on earth.  See Weber (1963, Ch. 9).  His most 
famous discussion of the relationship between salvation and achievement is in Weber (1930).  For survey 
essays on contemporary treatments of this theme, see Fischoff (1944) and Sprinzak (1972).  For specific 
treatments of the relationship between Protestantism and entrepreneurship, see Jeremy (1988, 1990, 1998), 
McClelland (1961), and Hagen (1962).  For a discussion of the relation between salvation and economic 
incentives in the main religious doctrines, see McCleary (2002). 
11 This theme was developed further by Berger (1967), who argued that, as countries modernized, economic 
practices would become institutionalized and, therefore, lose their religious underpinnings.  13
a religion that makes familial relations paramount would tend to be suspicious of 
contracts and commerce involving outsiders.  In this context, La Porta, et al (1998) find 
that legal traditions that originate from France (and, hence, perhaps ultimately from 
Catholicism) tend to provide less protection for outsiders than those that originate from 
England.  Consequently, businesses in French-origin countries tend to rely more on 
concentrated ownership and internal finance, rather than access to broad, impersonal 
equity and credit markets.   
Further analysis along these lines could lead to a general interaction between 
religion and the extent of international trade and finance.  That is, in countries where the 
dominant religion discourages interactions with strangers, the prediction is that 
international openness would be low.  For similar reasons, religion may influence the 
extent to which societies absorb the advanced technologies that originate in foreign 
countries. 
Another channel for economic effects of religion involves the role of a work ethic.  
Religions that instill a strong work ethic would stimulate labor effort and, thereby, 
increase productivity.   Religion may also encourage thrift and, hence, stimulate saving, 
investment, and growth.  In addition, religion may be productive by discouraging 
participation in “sinful” activities, such as gambling, sex outside of marriage, and 
consumption of alcohol and other drugs.  Through these channels, religion may lead to 
better health, which is a dimension of human capital that is known to raise productivity. 
Not all aspects of religion are favorable to economic performance.  For example, 
religion may retard growth by discouraging capital accumulation and the profit motive or 
by interfering with free-market activities, notably credit markets.  The prohibition of  14
interest in the Koran is a well-known example.
12  Religion might also be a negative factor 
if it diverts time and resources away from market activities and toward church 
attendance, the building of cathedrals, and the support of ascetic communities and 
mendicants.   
Religion’s role in discouraging or encouraging violent behavior domestically and 
internationally is an additional important issue that can interact with economic 
development.  The Crusades and the Inquisition demonstrate that religious extremism can 
sometimes be manifested in forms of international and domestic violence.  This pattern 
also appears in present day religious based conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland and in 
the international terrorism associated with Islamic extremists. 
In the various forces outlined in this section, the key elements were individuals’ 
beliefs, for example, with respect to salvation, honesty, thrift, and so on.  The analysis did 
not place weight on church attendance, per se, except to the extent that this participation 
in organized religion served to promote or diminish the various religious beliefs.
13  To 
put it another way, the theoretical analysis suggests a distinction between “believing 
versus belonging.”  For most purposes, the expectation is that believing is the force that 
counts.  For given levels of religious beliefs (measured empirically in the subsequent 
analysis from survey information), the extent of belonging may be unimportant for 
economic performance.  In fact, belonging could be a negative force if it reflects time 
                                                 
12 For an analysis of the economics of usury restrictions, see Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998).  Kuran 
(1993) provides a general analysis of the economic effects of Islam. 
13 An exception to this approach is Sacerdote and Glaeser’s (2001) argument that church-going is important 
for social capital in the form of networking.  Then, if this type of social capital were socially productive, 
Sacerdote and Glaeser would predict a positive effect of church attendance on economic performance, for 
given religious beliefs.  15
diverted away from productive activities and, perhaps, adverse effects from organized 
religion on political decision-making. 
 
B.  The Determination of Economic Growth 
Much of the first author’s research over the past decade has used the experience 
of a broad group of countries to assess the determinants of economic growth—see, for 
example, Barro (1991, 1997, 2000).  One conclusion from this work is that explanations 
of economic performance have to go beyond narrow measures of economic variables to 
encompass political and social factors.  In particular, the empirical results reveal 
important influences on growth from policies and institutions.   
Some researchers have argued that explanations for economic growth should go 
further to include independent variables that measure a nation’s “culture,” of which 
religion is one part.
14  Culture is usually thought to matter by affecting the kinds of traits 
already mentioned in the discussion of religion:  honesty, willingness to save and work 
hard, openness to strangers, and so on.  The arguments about culture mattering seem 
reasonable on an a priori basis, but much of the work in this literature is impressionistic, 
rather than quantitative or rigorous.  Therefore, one of our goals is to include quantifiable 
dimensions of culture, notably of religious participation and beliefs, into the kind of 
cross-country empirical analysis of economic growth that was implemented before. 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Huntington (1996) and Landes (1999).  16
III.  Data on religiosity across countries 
Our empirical research began with a previously constructed broad cross-country 
data set.  The data include national accounts variables and an array of other economic, 
political, and social indicators. 
We have expanded this data set to include measures of religiosity.  The most 
useful sources of international data on church attendance and religious beliefs seem to be 
the surveys reported in the three waves of the World Values Survey or WVS (1981-84, 
mostly 1981; 1990-93, mostly 1990; and 1995-97, mostly 1995 and 1996), the two 
reports on religion by the International Social Survey Programme or ISSP (1990-93, 
mostly 1991; and 1998-2000, mostly 1998), and the Gallup Millennium Survey (1999).  
We have also used a survey on religious behavior in Greece for 1987 and information for 
a few countries in the early 1980s from Gallup international surveys.  Another wave of 
the WVS applies to 2000-01 and will soon be available.  At present, we are using these 
data only to form country-wide averages of data at each survey date.  In subsequent 
analysis, we plan to use the individual data, which typically apply to 1000-2000 
respondents in each survey. 
Putting the various sources of religion data together, and considering the 
availability of data on other variables, we are presently able to carry out statistical 
analysis for up to 59 countries, which includes up to 23 countries observed around 1981, 
37 around 1990, 22 around 1991, 32 around 1995, 28 around 1998, and 41 around 1999.
15  
                                                 
15 For the 1981 data, the information from WVS is combined with Gallup data on weekly church attendance 
and belief in God for Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania and with Gallup data on belief in life-after-death for 
Brazil, India, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.  For the 1990 data, the information from WVS is 
combined with data from Eurodim for Greece in 1987 on church attendance and belief in God.  For the 
1991 data, for some countries for which church attendance data were unavailable from the 1991 ISSP, we 
used information from the 1993 or 1994 ISSP (which has information on church attendance but not 
religious beliefs).  These countries are Canada, Israel, Japan, Spain, Sweden, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,  17
The maximum number of country-time observations is 183.  The exact sample size for 
the various years depends on the particular measure of religiosity.  The forthcoming 
fourth wave of the WVS for 2000-01 appears to provide religion data for up to 71 
countries for which data on other variables are also available.  Hence, this new wave may 
allow a substantial increase in the sample. 
Table 1 shows the 59 countries in the sample.  The coverage is better for rich 
countries than for poor ones and for countries that are primarily of the Christian faith.
16  
The predominantly Muslim countries included are Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, and 
Turkey.
17  Countries in the sample that have predominantly eastern religions (including 
Buddhist), among persons expressing some religious adherence, are China, Hong Kong, 
Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
18  Malaysia also has substantial 
representation in these religions. 
Some of the survey questions relate to attendance at churches or analogous places 
of worship.  Specifically, we can use the responses to generate the fractions of the 
population that attended church at least weekly, at least monthly, and so on.  Some of the 
surveys (the two ISSP waves and the forthcoming 2000-01 WVS) include questions about 
time spent at prayer.  Other queries concern religious beliefs and attitudes; for example, 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Slovenia.  For Israel and Slovenia, the 1991 ISSP has data on religious beliefs but not church 
attendance.  The data for Israel from the 1991 and 1993 ISSP refer to the Jewish population only.  The 1998 
ISSP data refer to the overall Israeli population and were not used (because of this inconsistency) in the 
present study. 
16 Included here are several countries that are predominantly Orthodox—Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Russia.  Estonia and Latvia also have high Orthodox representations. 
17 Nigeria has religion data and is primarily Muslim.  However, missing data on other variables, such as 
educational attainment, prevent the inclusion of Nigeria in the statistical analysis. 
18 Some of these countries, most notably South Korea, have experienced large increases in Christian 
adherence over the last 30 years.  18
do you believe in God (in various forms), heaven, hell, and life after death?
19  Another 
question, which might be more robust across religious denominations, is whether the 
respondent considers himself or herself to be a religious person. 
We have used tables from the first edition of the World Christian Encyclopedia 
(Barrett [1982]) to assemble information on religious denominations (as professed in 
surveys or censuses in which people are asked to state the religion, if any, to which they 
adhere).  The data used in the present study apply to 1970 and 1980.
20  The second 
edition of the encyclopedia (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson [2001]) has updated 
information on religious adherence and will be used in subsequent analysis. 
The data on religious denominations allow us to construct a measure of religious 
pluralism, based on a Herfindahl index of adherence to the main religious 
denominations.
21  Table 1 shows the values that apply in 1980 to the countries used in the 
statistical analysis (as dictated by data availability).  Countries with low levels of 
pluralism include some that are predominantly Catholic (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, 
Ireland, and much of Latin America), Protestant Scandinavia, Orthodox Greece, and 
                                                 
19 The meaning of some of these questions is unclear for some religions.  For example, Buddhism has no 
concept of hell.  Also, heaven does not appear, at least literally, in Hinduism and Buddhism.  See McCleary 
(2002) for further discussion. 
20 For some of the eastern European countries, which did not exist or were not covered in Barrett’s (1981) 
first edition, the data come from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) and refer to 1970 and 1990. 
21 The pluralism measure is one minus the Herfindahl index for religious denominations among those 
professing some religion.  For this purpose, we grouped data on religious adherence from Barrett (1982) for 
1970 and 1980 into nine major categories:  Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Hindu, Buddhist, other eastern 
religions, Jewish, Orthodox, and other religions.  The Herfindahl index—the sum of the squares of the 
fractions belonging to each religion—can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected 
persons in a country belong to the same religion.  Hence, one minus the Herfindahl index is the probability 
that they belong to different religions and can, therefore, be viewed as an indicator of religious pluralism.  
(Implicitly, the differences between the religious groupings are assumed to be the same for all pairs.  
Otherwise, one could think of weighting denominations in accordance with the extent of differences among 
them.)  The Herfindahl index equals one and, hence, the pluralism indicator equals zero if everyone belongs 
to the same religion.  If there are two religions of equal size, the Herfindahl and pluralism variables each 
equal one-half.  The Herfindahl index equals (almost) zero and, hence, the pluralism indicator equals 
(almost) one if there are a large number of religious denominations each of which has a negligible fraction 
of the population.  With nine groupings, the lowest possible value of the Herfindahl index is 0.11, so that 
the highest possible value of the pluralism measure is 0.89.  19
Muslim Pakistan and Turkey.  Places that exhibit high levels of pluralism include the 
United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore. 
We have used Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson’s (2001, pp. 834-35) tabulations to 
measure the presence or absence of a state religion.  These classifications are clearer in 
some cases than in others.  In some of the straightforward situations, the constitution 
designates an official state church and restricts or prohibits other forms of religion.  
However, even without these designations or prohibitions, the government may 
systematically favor a religion through subsidies and tax collections or through the 
teaching of religion in public schools.  These considerations caused Barrett, et al, to 
classify some countries as having a “state religion,” despite the absence of an official 
state church in the constitution.  Controversial cases that fall into this category include 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which are considered to have a Roman Catholic state religion 
even in 2000.  Table 1 shows the classifications in 1970 for the countries used in the 
statistical analysis.  In subsequent work, it might be feasible to go beyond this dummy-
variable classification to consider gradations in the practice of state religion. 
We have used Barrett’s (1982) and Barrett, Kurian and Johnson’s (2001) 
discussion of each country (supplemented in some cases by individual country reports) to 
obtain a proxy for state regulation of religion.  We used the concept suggested by Chaves 
and Cann (1992)—whether the government appoints or approves church leaders.  The 
Barrett, et al, discussions of this concept typically refers to the late 1970s.  However, the 
information is incomplete in many cases and is not fully consistent across countries.   20
Hence, further analysis of other sources would likely improve the measure of state 
regulation of religion.  The data used in the present study are reported in Table 1. 
 
IV.  Cross-Country Empirical Findings on the Determinants of Religiosity 
A.  Setup of the Statistical Analysis 
Table 2 shows cross-country econometric results for measures of church 
attendance and religious beliefs.  There are six systems corresponding to the different 
measures of religiosity—fraction of the population attending church at least weekly in 
column 1, fraction attending at least monthly in column 2, fraction of the population who 
believe in heaven in column 3, fraction who believe in hell in column 4, fraction who 
believe in an after-life in column 5, and fraction who believe in God in some form in 
column 6.
22  The form of each dependent variable is the transformation log[x/(1-x)] of the 
original series x.  This form confines the fitted value of x to the interval (0,1).
23 
Each system consists of five or six equations corresponding to the religiosity 
survey data:  the first is for data around 1981 from the World Values Survey (WVS), the 
second is for data around 1990 from WVS, the third is for data around 1991 from the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the fourth is for data around 1995 from 
WVS, the fifth is for data around 1998 from ISSP, and the last is for 1999 data from 
Gallup (available only for church attendance and belief in God). 
In each system, the dependent variable is related in a regression framework to an 
array of explanatory variables.  These explanatory variables include four measures of 
                                                 
22 Similar results are obtained if the dependent variable is measured by the fraction of persons who consider 
themselves to be religious. 
23In this form, the marginal effect of an independent variable on x is given by the coefficient of the variable 
multiplied by the quantity x·(1-x).  This formula shows that the marginal effect of an explanatory variable 
on the variable x diminishes in magnitude as x approaches zero or one.  For a broad range of x—say 
between 0.2 and 0.8—the functional form can be reasonably approximated as linear.  21
economic development:  real per capita gross domestic product (GDP), average years of 
school attainment of the adult population aged 25 and over, the urbanization rate 
(typically the fraction of the population living in places with at least 2500 people), and 
the log of life expectancy at birth.  The systems also include two measures of age 
structure:  the fraction of the population aged 65 and over and the fraction aged 15 and 
under.
24  The first age variable gauges the extent of the elderly population, and the second 
one relates to the number of children per adult in the overall population.  
Previous analyses of the determinants of religiosity have tended to look at 
economic development as a single dimension.  However, the present data set includes 
enough observations to allow separation of the effects from the various dimensions of 
development that were discussed in the theoretical section.  The breadth of the data is 
crucial when trying to disentangle, for example, the effects of education, urbanization, 
per capita GDP, and life expectancy, all of which typically rise along with economic 
development.
25   
Another set of variables included in Table 2 involves the composition of the 
population by professed religious affiliation in 1980.  The present analysis uses an eight-
way breakdown into major categories:  Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Hindu, eastern 
religions (including Buddhist), Jewish, Orthodox, and other religions.  In each case, the 
variable refers to the fraction adhering to the specified religion among persons who 
                                                 
24 The GDP data are the Summers-Heston measures (which adjust for purchasing power differences across 
countries) and are available from www.nber.org.  These figures were updated from the World Bank, World 
Development Indicators.  The schooling data were assembled by Barro and Lee (2001) and are available 
from post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/barro.html.  The other variables are from the World Bank. 
25 Inglehart and Baker (2000) use a single cross-section from the World Values Survey to assess the 
relation of religious and other values to per capita GDP and industrial structure.  They also look at effects 
from different religious denominations and from a history of Communist government.  22
expressed adherence to some religion.
26  The econometric specification omits the 
Catholic fraction as a normalization.  Hence, each coefficient should be interpreted as the 
effect from the indicated religion relative to that for Catholic. 
The regression systems also include the previously discussed pluralism measure, 
which is computed from the Herfindahl index for the various religious affiliations in 1980 
(or for 1990 for some eastern European countries).  The Herfindahl measure was 
calculated from a nine-way breakdown of affiliations that distinguishes Buddhist from 
other eastern religions.  (For the denominational variables, Buddhist and other eastern 
religions were combined because of a lack of sufficient data from Asian countries to 
distinguish these two categories.) 
Finally, the system includes a number of variables related to government 
influences on the religion market.  These variables are the dummy for the presence of an 
official state religion, the dummy for whether the government regulates the religion 
market (by appointing or approving church leaders), and dummies for the presence and 
subsequent removal of Communist regimes. 
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables used in the 
regressions.  Tables 4 and 5 show actual and fitted values of the dependent variables for 
selected observations.  (Many of these countries have been viewed as “interesting” in the 
literature and are, therefore, not a random selection.)  Table 4 applies to monthly church 
attendance and Table 5 to belief in heaven. 
                                                 
26 Our idea is that the composition of religious adherence across persons who exhibit some adherence may 
conceivably be exogenous with respect to church attendance and religious beliefs.  However, it is 
unreasonable to regard the breakdown between some and no adherence (appearing in the data as non-
religious or atheist) as exogenous with respect to attending church or holding religious beliefs.  Therefore, 
it would be inappropriate to include among the explanatory variables a measure of the fraction of the 
population that expressed no religious adherence.   23
 
B.  Effects of Economic Variables 
The data reveal an overall pattern in which economic development is associated 
with less religiosity, measured by church attendance or beliefs.  This pattern can be seen 
by looking at simple relations (where no other variables are held constant) between a 
measure of religiosity and per capita GDP, which we take as the basic indicator of 
development.  As examples, negative associations with per capita GDP appear for 
monthly church attendance in Figure 1 and for belief in heaven in Figure 2.   
The statistical results shown in Table 2 reveal very different patterns for the 
individual dimensions of economic development.  One result that shows up clearly is a 
significantly positive estimated coefficient for education in all of the equations for church 
attendance and religious beliefs.  These results reflect partial relationships.  For example, 
the regression framework isolates a positive relation between education and church 
attendance, while holding constant the correlated development indicators—per capita 
GDP, urbanization, life expectancy, and age structure—as well as the other explanatory 
variables shown in Table 2.  The estimated coefficient of 0.191 (s.e.=0.035) in column 2 
implies that 2 extra years of average schooling (the sample standard deviation of this 
variable) would raise monthly attendance by 9 percentage points, starting from the mean 
value for attendance of 36%. 
The positive, partial relation between monthly church attendance and education is 
shown graphically in Figure 3.  Note that this diagram holds constant the influence on 
monthly church attendance from the explanatory variables other than education that are 
included in Table 2.  (See the notes to figures for a discussion.)  This positive association  24
accords with Sacerdote and Glaeser’s (2001) analysis, which focused on the incentives of 
more educated people to attend group activities, including church services.   
However, Figure 4 shows that a similar positive, partial relation appears for belief 
in heaven.  Similar patterns also apply for beliefs in hell, an after-life, and God (and also 
for a person’s tendency to classify himself or herself as religious).  The positive, partial 
relations of religious beliefs to education suggest that the beliefs do not rely on ignorance 
or non-scientific thinking.  Thus, these relations conflict with Hume’s (1757) views on 
the irrationality of religion.  As mentioned before, a positive relation between education 
and religious beliefs might arise because these beliefs can never be proved or disproved 
and, therefore, depend on faith and the capacity for abstraction.  Hence, believing may 
come more readily to more educated or scientific persons, who have a greater capacity to 
engage generally in abstract or theoretical reasoning. 
Another clear pattern in Table 2 is the significantly negative relation between the 
measures of religiosity and the urbanization rate.  The estimated coefficient of -1.41 
(s.e.=0.32) for monthly church attendance in column 2 means that an increase in the 
urbanization rate by 0.15 (its sample standard deviation) would lower monthly attendance 
by about 5 percentage points.  The negative, partial relation between monthly attendance 
and the urbanization rate is shown graphically in Figure 5. 
The inverse relation between church attendance and urbanization is consistent 
with the argument that church services would have little competition from other forms of 
social interaction in rural areas.  This negative association would be expected to carry 
over to religious beliefs if participation in organized services were conducive to the 
maintenance of these beliefs.  Another possible explanation for the inverse relation  25
between urbanization and beliefs is that the uncertainty of economic conditions—and, 
hence, the demand for religious assistance—is greater in rural settings.  The estimated 
coefficients are, in fact, negative for the various religious beliefs.  The relation with belief 
in heaven is shown graphically in Figure 6. 
Table 2 also shows significantly negative relations between church attendance and 
life expectancy.  The estimated coefficient of -4.9 (s.e.=1.7) in column 2 means that a rise 
in life expectancy by 7% (the sample standard deviation) would lower monthly church 
attendance by about 8 percentage points.  This relation is depicted graphically in Figure 
7.  An inverse effect of life expectancy on church attendance is consistent with theories in 
which people defer investments in churchgoing when they are far away from their 
anticipated deaths.  (Recall that age structure is held constant in the regressions.) 
In contrast, the results show positive relations between life expectancy and 
religious beliefs, although the estimated coefficients are statistically significant only for 
the beliefs in heaven, hell, and an after-life.  The relation for heaven is shown in Figure 8.  
One might have expected the inverse relation between life expectancy and church 
attendance to carry over to religious beliefs.  However, aside from the channel working 
through church attendance, the theoretical analysis makes no clear predictions about how 
life expectancy would relate to these beliefs.  That is, people who are further away from 
death may have low incentives to spend time at church, but they need not have low levels 
of religious conviction. 
The estimates shown in Table 2 indicate that, once the other development 
indicators are held constant, the relation between church attendance and per capita GDP 
is not statistically significantly different from zero.  The relation of the religious beliefs to  26
per capita GDP is negative and marginally significant.  Figures 9 and 10 show the partial 
associations of monthly church attendance and belief in heaven with per capita GDP.     
For age structure, one result in Table 2 is that a greater presence of children 
(higher population share under age 16) goes along with greater church attendance.  This 
pattern accords with theoretical presumptions.  However, there is no clear relation 
empirically between the presence of children and religious beliefs.  The theory also does 
not suggest clear patterns for these relationships. 
The old-age fraction is not significantly related to church attendance.  This 
finding accords with the ambiguity in the theory, whereby the elderly would wish to 
attend church more often because of their impending deaths but would be deterred by the 
likely high costs of going to church.  The empirical results indicate a negative association 
between the old-age fraction and religious beliefs, although the theory is silent on these 
relations. 
We can also use the empirical framework to investigate whether there is any 
secular trend in religiosity for given values of the economic variables (and for given 
values of the other explanatory variables shown in Table 2).  In the systems shown in 
Table 2, the same constant applies for the various survey years, except that dummy 
variables were included to allow for systematic differences in the three sources, WVS, 
ISSP, and Gallup.  Within the WVS and ISSP data, the same constant terms were 
estimated for the surveys from different dates (WVS for 1981, 1990, and 1995, and ISSP 
for 1991 and 1998).  Thus, we can test for a secular trend in the religiosity variables by 
allowing these constant terms to vary over these dates.  27
The conclusion is that, at the 5% critical level, the only statistical evidence for a 
trend is for belief in hell—in this case, beliefs appear to be rising over time.  At the 10% 
critical level, there is indication of a declining trend in monthly church attendance.  For 
the other variables, the hypothesis of equal constant terms for the different years would 
be accepted at a 10% or higher critical level. 
 
C.  Effects of State Religion, State Regulation, and Communism 
Table 2 shows that the estimated coefficients on the state-religion dummy 
variable are significantly positive for church attendance.  The estimated value of 0.85 
(s.e.=0.14) in column 2 implies that the imposition of a state religion would raise the 
monthly church attendance rate by 19 percentage points (starting again from the mean 
attendance rate of 36%).
27  This pattern conflicts with the one predicted in the religion-
market model of Stark and Bainbridge (1987), Iannaccone (1991), Finke and Stark 
(1992), and Finke and Iannaccone (1993).  In that view, state religion promotes 
monopoly and, therefore, poor service and low rates of church attendance.  However, 
since state religion also typically goes along with substantial state subsidy, it is not 
                                                 
27 These results apply when we use the status of state religion as of 1970.  Our sample does not contain 
enough instances of change after 1970 to assess the responses of church attendance and religious beliefs.  
The main example of a shift since 1970 is Ireland’s abandoning Roman Catholicism as its state religion in 
1972, although Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) continue to classify Ireland as officially religious, but 
no longer officially Roman Catholic.  Legislative changes also occurred after 1970 in Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain, but Barrett, et al, continue to label these countries as maintaining a Roman Catholic state religion 
even in 2000.  More recently, some Scandinavian countries have abandoned the Lutheran church as the 
state religion.  If we compare 1970 with 1900, then we find many examples of countries having 
relinquished state religions.  Using Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson’s (2001) data, examples for countries in 
our sample are Brazil, Chile, China, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Russia.  
Some countries that were not independent in 1900 (Bangladesh, Israel, and Pakistan in our sample) 
introduced state religions when they became independent.  We also have information from Barrett, Kurian, 
and Johnson (2001) for a classification of governments as officially religious, although not maintaining a 
single religion.  Examples in 1970 for countries in our sample are South Africa, Brazil, Philippines, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Switzerland, and Australia.  If we enter an additional dummy variable into the 
systems of Table 2 to capture this officially religious category, the estimated coefficients on this new 
variable are close to zero.  28
surprising that the overall relation between state religion and church attendance would be 
positive.   
We should note that our results for state religion apply while holding constant a 
measure of religious pluralism (discussed below).  One part of the argument in the 
religion-market model is that an established state religion will help to maintain a low 
degree of religious pluralism.  Hence, the pluralism variable could be getting credit for 
some of the influence on church attendance that stems ultimately from the presence of an 
established religion.  If we delete the pluralism index from the system for monthly church 
attendance, then the estimated coefficient on the state religion dummy becomes 0.56 
(s.e.=0.13), which is smaller than before but still significantly positive.  Our analysis also 
includes the dummy variable for the presence of state regulation of religion.  Since this  
regulatory system often accompanies a state religion (see Table 1), the regulatory 
variable could be getting credit for some of the effect that stems ultimately from state 
religion.  If we delete the regulatory variable, as well as the pluralism index, from the 
system for monthly church attendance, then the estimated coefficient on the state religion 
dummy falls further to 0.30 (s.e.=0.13). 
In the literature, the Scandinavian countries are often cited as examples of places 
in which state churches co-exist with low rates of church attendance.  That pattern does 
characterize the data in our study.  However, it turns out that the low rates of attendance 
in these countries are explained well by the model estimated in Table 2, despite the 
positive coefficient on the state-religion dummy.  For example, Table 4 shows that the 
residual for Sweden in 1990 is actually positive.
28  That is, although church attendance is 
                                                 
28 The Lutheran church was the state religion of Sweden during our sample.  However, Sweden formally 
dropped its state religion in 2000.  29
low—10% at the monthly frequency—it is greater than the value predicted by the model.  
The reason is that the other variables contained in the system—notably the overall 
influence of the economic variables and the composition of religious denominations 
(discussed in the next section)—tend to generate low rates of church attendance.  This 
pattern turns out to apply also to the other Scandinavian countries—Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, and Norway—all of which had state religions in 1970. 
Table 2 shows that the estimated coefficients for the state-religion dummy are 
also significantly positive for religious beliefs, notably for those in heaven and hell.  For 
example, the estimated coefficient for belief in heaven in column 3 is 1.11 (s.e.=0.18).  
These results suggest that the state sponsorship that encourages church attendance is also 
somewhat successful in engendering high levels of beliefs.   
Again, the effects from state religion may interact with the influences of religious 
pluralism and government regulation.  If we delete the pluralism variable from the system 
for belief in heaven, then the estimated coefficient on the state religion dummy falls to 
0.77 (s.e.=0.16).  If we also delete the dummy variable for state regulation of religion, 
then the estimated value falls further to 0.62 (s.e.=0.15).  Although this estimated 
coefficient is about half that found in column 3 of Table 2, it is still significantly positive. 
The results in Table 2 indicate that government regulation of religion tends to 
depress church attendance and some of the religious beliefs.  That is, the argument from 
the religion-market model about the ill effects of government involvement seems to hold 
with respect to public regulation.  It may be that better measurement of the indicator for 
regulation would further sharpen these results.  30
Quantitatively, the estimated coefficient of -0.59 (s.e.=0.11) on the state 
regulation dummy variable in column 2 of Table 2 means that the introduction of a 
government regulatory system for religion would lower monthly attendance by about 14 
percentage points.  As already noted, state religion and government regulation of religion 
often come as a package—see Table 1.  If a state religion is imposed along with 
regulation, then the estimated net effect on monthly church attendance is positive but by 
only about 5 percentage points.  
Not surprisingly, the presence of a Communist regime has a substantial negative 
relation with the measures of church attendance and religious beliefs.  Specifically, the 
estimated coefficient of -0.74 (s.e.=0.21) in column 2 of Table 2 implies that the 
imposition of a Communist regime would lower monthly church attendance by 17 
percentage points. 
By comparing the three later surveys—WVS around 1995, ISSP around 1998, and 
Gallup in 1999—with the three earlier ones, we can estimate how the downfall of the 
Communist systems in Eastern Europe affected religiosity.  The results are that church 
attendance and religious beliefs tended to recover in the former Communist countries 
during the 1990s.
29  For example, in the 1999 equation for monthly church attendance, 
the net remaining effect from the presence of Communism before 1990 is given by the 
                                                 
29 Poland is an exception to this pattern, as it exhibits a small decline in church attendance during the 
1990s.  However, Poland is even more of an outlier with respect to its high rates of church attendance 
before the 1990s.  As shown in Table 4, the empirical model explains virtually none of Poland’s high rate 
of church attendance in 1990.  Some observers explain the high religiosity in Poland during the Communist 
period by observing that the Catholic church occupied a chief position of political opposition to the 
government and was popular and important for these reasons.  The decline in religious participation in the 
1990s could then reflect the elimination of this political role for the church, once the Communist regime 
collapsed.  Although these arguments seem reasonable, they have the shortcoming of explaining the 
vibrancy of religion in Poland up to 1990 by observing that it was vibrant.  The question is, why did 
religion occupy a different place in Poland than, say, in Hungary or Czechoslovakia (which were also 
historically predominantly Roman Catholic)?  More generally, it is not a satisfactory empirical strategy to 
come up with a special argument for each observation that does not fit the model.  31
coefficient on the Communism dummy, -0.74, plus the coefficient for ex-Communism (in 
1999), 0.59.  Hence, the net remaining effect estimated for 1999 is a coefficient of -0.15, 
implying a net reduction of monthly attendance by only about 3 percentage points. 
 
D.  Religious Pluralism and Religious Denominations 
Table 2 shows that the religious pluralism indicator (shown in Table 1) has 
significantly positive coefficients in the systems for church attendance.
30  The partial 
relation with monthly church attendance is shown graphically in Figure 11.  This pattern 
accords with the argument from the religion-market model that greater pluralism will 
encourage competition among religion providers and lead, thereby, to better service and 
higher rates of attendance.  The estimated coefficient in column 2 of 1.20 (s.e.=0.30) 
means that an increase in pluralism by 0.23 (its sample standard deviation) raises monthly 
church attendance by about 6 percentage points.  Greater pluralism also has a 
significantly positive relation with some of the beliefs—those in heaven and hell—but 
not with others.  The partial relation with belief in heaven appears in Figure 12. 
With respect to the composition of religious adherence, recall that each coefficient 
should be interpreted as the effect relative to that for Catholic (which is omitted from the 
systems).  Recall also that the variables are the fractions of the population adhering to the 
indicated religion among persons who express adherence to some religion. 
                                                 
30 One possible difficulty here is that an exogenous increase in the demand for religion could lead, in the 
long run, to a greater variety of religious denominations.  That is, there might be reverse causation from 
church attendance and religious beliefs to the pluralism indicator.  32
For church attendance, the main finding is that most of the denominations exhibit 
lower rates of participation than the Catholic one.
31  The exceptions are Muslim (which is 
weakly positive) and other religions (which has a coefficient close to zero).  For the 
religious beliefs, most of the denominations are again lower than Catholic.  However, 
Muslim is again positive, the other religion variable is now positive, and the Orthodox 
religion has coefficients close to zero in some cases.  Particularly striking are the high 
positive coefficients for the Muslim denomination in the system for belief in heaven and, 
even more so, in the system for belief in hell. 
 
E.  Superstition 
As discussed before, one dimension of the secularization hypothesis is that 
increased education would generate lower levels of church attendance and religious 
beliefs.  One argument for this pattern (which we did not observe in the data) was that 
religion amounts to superstition and ignorance and, hence, that religious activities would 
decline as people became more knowledgeable.   
Another way to assess this hypothesis is to look directly at other beliefs that seem 
to reflect more clearly superstition and ignorance.  The ISSP surveys offer three good 
candidates:  one referring to fortune tellers (“some fortune tellers really can foresee the 
future”), another to horoscopes (“a person’s star sign at birth, or horoscope, can affect the 
course of their future”), and the last to good-luck charms (“good luck charms sometimes 
do bring good luck”).  The predictive content from these three forecasting “tools” should 
                                                 
31 These results can reflect differences across religions in the role of attending church or analogous houses 
of worship.  For example, religions vary by the weight that they attach to organized services versus 
personal prayer.  33
be scientifically testable.  Although we have not done the analysis, we take it as plausible 
that none of the three actually has predictive content. 
Data on the three superstition variables are available only for 17 Christian 
countries, which are listed in Table 6.  The table shows the fraction of persons holding 
each of the three types of belief.  We were surprised by the high levels—they range from 
19% of the Irish population believing in horoscopes to 80% of the Latvian population 
believing in fortune tellers.   
Table 7 shows that there is a strong positive correlation among the three measures 
of superstition.  Therefore, we focus on the average of the three, as shown in the first 
column of Table 6.  These values range from 25% in Ireland to 73% in Latvia. 
Table 8 shows, for the 17 countries included in Table 6, the correlations among 
the six religion variables that we considered before.  These correlations are strongly 
positive whether we look at church attendance or the various religious beliefs.  However, 
the most interesting finding, shown in the first column of Table 8, is that the correlation 
between the average superstition indicator and each of the religion variables is negative.  
These values range from -0.36 for belief in hell to -0.63 for belief in heaven. 
One clear conclusion is that religious beliefs and superstitious beliefs are very 
different.  A possible reason is that religious beliefs are compatible with increased 
education and knowledge, whereas the superstitious beliefs are not.
32  However, another 
possibility is that the superstitions tend to substitute for religious beliefs and activities in 
societies where the standard religious practices are suppressed or are unavailable for 
other reasons.  This idea accords with the observation that the superstition variables, 
                                                 
32 We do not have sufficient data on the superstition variables to carry out the sort of cross-country 
statistical analysis done in Table 2.  34
shown in Table 6, are the highest in the formerly Communist countries of eastern Europe.  
Another point is that organized religions, notably the Roman Catholic church, try to 
suppress superstitions, including the labeling of some of these practices as sins.  Possibly, 
as in the attempts of Communist governments to eradicate “respectable” religions, the 
idea is to suppress competition.
33  The success of this anti-superstition campaign may 
explain why the superstition variables are particularly low in the most devout Catholic 
countries included in Table 6, Ireland and the Philippines. 
 
V.  Determinants of economic growth 
Table 9 contains cross-country panel regressions for the growth rate of per capita 
GDP.  The dependent variable is measured over the periods 1965-75, 1975-85, and 1985-
95.  The framework, based on Barro (1997, 2000), includes an array of explanatory 
variables:  the log of per capita GDP at the start of each period, average years of 
secondary and higher school attainment at the start of each period, a measure of 
international openness (the period average of the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP), 
the period average of the ratio of government consumption to GDP, the log of life 
expectancy at birth at the start of each period (an indicator of health), the growth rate 
over each period of the terms of trade (export prices relative to import prices), a 
subjective indicator of the maintenance of the rule of law, the log of the total fertility rate 
at the start of each period, the retail price inflation rate for each period, and the period 
average of the ratio of total investment to GDP.  For further discussion of the framework 
and these variables, see Barro (2000) and the notes to Table 9. 
                                                 
33 The Catholic church may also have competed by incorporating magical practices into its own 
ceremonies, notably the Eucharist in which a wafer and wine are identified with the body and blood of 
Christ.  Luther denounced these practices as untenable.  35
  The regressions include all countries for which data on all of the variables are 
available.  In systems that exclude measures of church attendance and beliefs, we are able 
to include 84 countries.  However, in the systems that incorporate these religion 
variables, the sample size falls to between 39 and 46 countries (observed over three time 
periods).  The 39-country sample includes 2 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 8 in Latin 
America, 9 in Asia, and 20 industrialized countries (not including those in Asia). 
The system in column 1 of Table 9 includes as explanatory variables the fractions 
of the adhering population in 1970 or 1980 attached to seven major religious 
denominations.  (The Catholic denomination is again omitted as a normalization).  This 
specification excludes measures of religious attendance and beliefs.  In this system, the 
estimated coefficient of initial per capita GDP is negative and highly significant.  This 
result reflects a conditional convergence force—for given values of the other explanatory 
variables, growth is higher if a country starts out poorer.  The other estimated influences 
are positive effects from initial schooling and life expectancy; positive effects from 
international openness, the rule of law, and the investment ratio; negative effects from 
fertility, government consumption, and inflation; and a positive effect from the growth of 
the terms of trade.  The general pattern of these results is similar in the other systems 
shown in Table 9. 
The main finding about religion in column 1 of Table 9 is that differences in the 
composition of the population among the major religious denominations have little 
consequence for economic growth, once one holds constant the explanatory variables 
mentioned above.  Note that these variables include the initial level of economic 
development, as measured by per capita GDP, schooling, life expectancy, and so on.   36
None of the estimated coefficients on the religious denomination variables in column 1 
are individually statistically significant.  The hypothesis that all of these coefficients are 
equal to zero is accepted at a critical level (p-value) of 0.10.  Thus, probably not as a 
surprise to Weber (1930), the composition of religious denominations does not matter 
much for modern economic growth. 
Each of the other systems in Table 9 excludes the denominational composition but 
includes one measure of church attendance and one measure of religious beliefs.  As 
already mentioned, the sample sizes for these systems are much smaller than that in 
column 1.  In order not to lose even more observations, we entered into the regressions a 
single measure of church attendance or religious belief for each period for countries that 
had data on these concepts at any point in time.  Specifically, we defined a measure of 
attendance or belief for a country to be the value from WVS 1990 if available, then we 
filled in with the value from WVS 1981 if the 1990 value was unavailable.  (We adjusted 
for the average discrepancy between the two values among countries that had information 
for both years.)  If neither of these values were available, then we used in an analogous 
way the value for ISSP 1991, then WVS 1995, then ISSP 1998, and finally Gallup 1999.  
This procedure means that the systems for economic growth incorporate on the right-
hand side measures of religious attendance and beliefs that post-date the growth rates.   
One reason that the use of later observations on the right-hand side of the 
equations might be satisfactory is that religious attendance and beliefs exhibit a lot of 
persistence over time.  Hence, the later values might proxy satisfactorily for the earlier 
ones, which can be viewed as the true causes of differences in growth rates.  However, 
the previous analysis already documented responses of religiosity to economic and  37
political variables.  Thus, there is a good chance that the religion measures pick up 
reverse causation from economic development to religiosity, rather than the reverse. 
To deal with this reverse-causation issue, we used instrumental variables 
suggested by the regressions shown in Table 2, in which the religion measures were the 
dependent variables.  Specifically, we use as instruments the dummy variable for the 
presence of a state religion (in 1970), the dummy variable for the existence of state 
regulation of religion (in the 1970s), and the pluralism index constructed from the 
composition of religious denominations in 1970 or 1980.
34  It is, of course, possible that 
the proposed instruments—although prior in time to most of the growth observations—
are themselves endogenous.  For example, over long periods, economic development 
could induce countries to drop their official state religions or their regulatory systems for 
religion.  No instruments are ever perfect! 
We found that monthly church attendance provided a slightly better fit than 
weekly attendance to the growth data.  Since the results were basically similar, we report 
only the estimates that use monthly attendance.  The religious beliefs, already discussed, 
refer to heaven, hell, God, and an after-life. 
Column 2 of Table 9 reveals the typical pattern of results.  The estimated 
coefficient on church attendance is significantly negative, whereas that on beliefs—in this 
case in heaven—is significantly positive.
35  The estimated coefficient on monthly 
attendance (-0.0078 [s.e.=0.0023]) means that an increase in this variable by one standard 
deviation (1.20) would reduce the growth rate on impact by 0.9 percent per year.  The 
                                                 
34 We also estimated systems in which the instrument list was expanded to include the fractions of the 
adhering population for the major religious denominations in 1970 or 1980.  In this case, the results were 
close to those obtained when the religious attendance and belief variables were themselves included in the 
instrument lists. 
35 As before, each religion variable, x, is entered in the form log[x/(1-x)].  38
estimated coefficient (0.0072 [s.e.=0.0024]) on belief in heaven means that a rise in this 
variable by one standard deviation (1.16) would raise the growth rate on impact by 0.8 
percent per year.   
Since monthly church attendance and belief in heaven are highly correlated (and 
also have similar sample standard deviations), the results suggest that being more or less 
religious overall—in the sense of attendance and belief moving together in the typical 
manner—would not have a strong relationship to economic growth.  To check this idea, 
we estimated systems in which church attendance or beliefs, but not both, were included 
in the regressions.  If we include monthly church attendance by itself, then the estimated 
coefficient is about half the magnitude found before:  -0.0042 (s.e.=0.0018).  If we 
include belief in heaven by itself, then the estimated coefficient is less than one-third that 
found before and is no longer statistically significant:  0.0022 (s.e. =0.0020).  Therefore, 
our inference is that the main growth effect is a positive response to an increase in 
believing relative to belonging (that is, attending).   
This pattern makes sense if we think of believing as the fundamental output of the 
religion sector.  Growth is then positively related to the productivity of the religion sector 
in the sense of the level of belief expressed relative to sectoral inputs, which include the 
level of church attendance. 
Column 3 of the table repeats the estimation with the three instrumental variables 
mentioned before substituted for the monthly church attendance and belief-in-heaven 
variables in the instrument lists.  The pattern of results remains the same as in column 2, 
but the magnitude of both estimated coefficients (as well as their standard errors) 
increase.  The estimated coefficients are now -0.0129 (0.0041) for monthly attendance  39
and 0.0140 (0.0043) for belief in heaven.  Hence, both variables continue to be 
statistically significant. 
We again find that the patterns are much weaker for religiosity overall.  For 
example, if monthly church attendance is included by itself, the estimated coefficient 
when the three instrumental variables are used is -0.0078 (0.0036).  The corresponding 
estimate for belief in heaven, when entered by itself, is 0.0022 (0.0020).  Thus, growth is 
again found to respond mainly when believing increases relative to belonging.   
Our overall conclusion, based on the arguable exogeneity of the three 
instrumental variables that we employed, is there is reason to believe that the estimates 
reflect effects of religion on economic growth, rather than the reverse.  Hence, we have 
some evidence that an increase in religious beliefs (at least belief in heaven) or a decrease 
in church attendance tends to stimulate economic growth. 
Figures 13 and 14 depict the partial relations between the rate of economic growth 
and the variables that measure monthly church attendance and belief in heaven.  (These 
figures are constructed from the estimates shown in column 3 of Table 9.)  These 
diagrams are constructed in a manner analogous to those based on Table 2.  In particular, 
the diagrams hold constant the influence on economic growth from all of the explanatory 
variables other than the one shown on the horizontal axis.  Note especially that, in Figure 
13, the value for belief in heaven is held constant, whereas in Figure 14, the value for 
monthly church attendance is held fixed.  Thus, the figures represent the effect on 
economic growth not from an overall change in religiosity but, rather, from a shift in 
belonging with believing held fixed or vice versa.  40
In columns 4 and 5 of Table 9, the belief measure refers to hell.  The results are 
similar to those for belief in heaven, although the belief-in-hell variable becomes only 
marginally significant in the case where the three instrumental variables are used. 
The results in columns 6-9 of the table measure beliefs in relation to God and an 
after-life.  The results are weaker in these cases than for those in columns 1-4, but the 
general pattern of the estimates is the same. 
 
VI.  Major Results and Concluding Observations 
  Our empirical work used a cross-country panel that includes country level 
information on church attendance and religious beliefs.  These data derive from 
individual survey data.   
Although religiosity tends to decline overall with economic development, the 
patterns of response depend on the specific dimensions of development.  For example, 
the measures of religiosity are positively related to education and negatively related to 
urbanization.  Enhanced life expectancy and reduced fertility are inversely related to 
church attendance but have weak associations with religious beliefs. 
  The presence of a state religion is positively related to the religion measures, 
probably because of the subsidies that typically flow to the established religions.  
However, religiosity is negatively associated with government regulation of the religion 
market and with the presence of a Communist government.  The elimination of the 
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe led to a recovery of religiosity in most countries 
during the 1990s.  41
  Greater religious pluralism, measured by the diversity of adherence among major 
denominations, is associated with higher church attendance and beliefs.  Across the 
denominations, religiosity tends to be highest for Muslim, then Catholic, then the other 
religions, which include Hindu, Buddhist, Orthodox, Protestant, and Jewish. 
  The analysis of the determinants of economic growth reveals little connection to 
the patterns of adherence across the major religions.  However, growth responds 
positively to enhanced religious beliefs—notably belief in heaven—and negatively to 
increased church attendance.  These patterns remain intact when we use instrumental 
variables to control for possible reverse causation.  The instruments that we use are the 
existence of a state religion, the presence of government regulation of religion, and the 
extent of religious pluralism.  Thus, our inference is that economic performance is 
stimulated by believing but retarded by belonging.  We interpret this pattern as reflecting 
a positive connection between economic performance and the level of “productivity” in 
the religion sector. 
  In subsequent research, we plan to investigate the effects of religiosity on political 
and social variables, including democracy, the rule of law, fertility, and health.  We plan 
also to study how the process of economic development influences the role of organized 
religion in a country’s political and legal structure, including the propensity to have state 
religions.  We will also assess the influence of organized religion on legislation, such as 
that related to economic regulation, marriage, divorce, birth control, abortion, and 
euthanasia.  We plan also to extend our present analysis of religiosity at a country-wide 
level to behavior at the individual level.  42
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Table 1   
State Religion, State Regulation of Religion, and Religious Pluralism 













Cameroon  0 0  0.73  Cyprus  0 0  0.36 
Ghana 0 0  0.72  Denmark  1 0  0.02 
S.  Africa  0 0  0.63  Finland  1 1  0.03 
Canada  0 0  0.56  France  0 1  0.17 
Dom. Rep.  1  0  0.05  W. Germany  0  0  0.54 
Mexico  0 0  0.05  Greece  1 1  0.04 
U.S.  0 0  0.64  Hungary 0 1  0.47 
Argentina  1 1  0.13  Iceland  1 0  0.03 
Brazil  0 0  0.20  Ireland  1 0  0.08 
Chile  0 0  0.22  Italy  1 1  0.01 
Colombia  1 0  0.05  Netherlands  0 0  0.53 
Peru  1 1  0.09  Norway  1 1  0.01 
Uruguay  0 0  0.14  Poland  0 0  0.19 
Venezuela  1 1  0.08  Portugal 1 0  0.02 
Bangladesh  1 1  0.24  Spain  1 0  0.00 
China  0 1  0.46  Sweden  1 1  0.08 
Hong  Kong  0 0  0.60  Switzerland  0 0  0.51 
India  0 0  0.31  Turkey  0 1  0.01 
Israel  1 0  0.19  U.K.  1 1  0.33 
Japan  0 0  0.46  Australia  0 0  0.51 
S. Korea  0  0  0.33  New Zealand  0  0  0.37 
Malaysia  1 0  0.68  Bulgaria 0 0  0.28 
Pakistan  1 0  0.06  Czech  Rep.  0 1  0.43 
Philippines  0 0  0.28  Estonia  0 1  0.48 
Singapore  0 0  0.63  Latvia  0 1  0.68 
Taiwan  0 0  0.58  Lithuania  0 1  0.13 
Thailand  1 1  0.14  Romania 0 0  0.40 
Austria 0 0  0.15  Russia  0 1  0.51 
Belgium  0 0  0.05  Slovak  Rep.  0 1  0.34 




Notes to Table 1 
 
The presence of a state religion (value 1 for the dummy variable) refers to the 
situation around 1970, as designated by Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001, pp. 834-35).  
We assigned the value one only if Barrett, et al, designated an individual religion, not if 
they classified the state as favoring religion in general.  State regulation (value 1) refers 
to a situation in which the state appoints or approves church leaders.  This designation 
comes from discussions in Barrett (1982) and Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) and 
elsewhere and typically applies during the late 1970s.  The pluralism index is one minus 
the Herfindahl index based on the fractions of adherents in 1980 in nine major religious 
denominations among persons expressing adherence to some religion.  The 
denominations are Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Hindu, Buddhist, other eastern religions, 
Jewish, Orthodox, and other. These data are from Barrett (1982).  For the Eastern 
European countries shown at the end of the table, the data are from Barrett, Kurian, and 
Johnson (2001) and apply in 1990.  The countries shown are the ones included in the 




Determinants of Church Attendance and Religious Beliefs 
      
 (1)  (2)  (3) 





belief in heaven 
     
log(per capita GDP)  0.26 (0.16)  0.24 (0.15)  -0.40 (0.20) 
years of education  0.221 (.039)  0.191 (.035)  0.239 (.042) 
urbanization rate  -1.72 (0.36)  -1.41 (0.32)  -1.48 (0.42) 
log(life expectancy)  -5.2 (1.8)  -4.9 (1.7)  5.2 (2.3) 
population share ≥ 65  -0.8 (3.2)  -1.9 (3.0)  -9.6 (4.3) 
population share ≤ 15  4.3 (2.1)  4.5 (2.0)  4.8 (2.9) 
religious pluralism   1.50 (0.34)  1.20 (0.30)  1.32 (0.37) 
state religion  0.82 (0.16)  0.85 (0.14)  1.11 (0.18) 
regulation of religion  -0.63 (0.12)  -0.59 (0.11)  -0.35 (0.13) 
Communist regime  -0.69 (0.22)  -0.74 (0.21)  -0.83 (0.25) 
ex-Communist (in 1995)  0.23 (0.18)  0.32 (0.18)  0.59 (0.23) 
ex-Communist (in 1998)  0.38 (0.18)  0.51 (0.14)  0.32 (0.16) 
ex-Communist (in 1999)  0.45 (0.24)  0.59 (0.22)  -- 
ISSP data  -0.30 (0.08)  -0.18 (0.07)  0.10 (0.08) 
Gallup data  -0.02 (0.11)  -0.12 (0.10)  -- 
Muslim fraction  0.84 (0.31)  0.11 (0.28)  2.05 (0.42) 
Protestant fraction  -2.86 (0.21)  -2.34 (0.19)  -1.41 (0.24) 
Hindu fraction  -0.94 (0.49)  -0.93 (0.46)  -1.88 (0.58) 
eastern religion fraction  -2.86 (0.26)  -2.48 (0.24)  -1.38 (0.30) 
Jewish fraction  -2.49 (0.59)  -2.98 (0.50)  -3.17 (0.44) 
Orthodox fraction  -2.64 (0.26)  -1.65 (0.23)  -1.50 (0.29) 
other religion fraction  -0.29 (0.88)  -0.49 (0.83)  3.28 (1.09) 
      
number of countries & total 
observations 
59, 183  59, 181  50, 129 
number of observations for 
each equation 
23, 37, 22,   
32, 28, 41 
22, 36, 22,    
32, 28, 41 
21, 33, 16,    
30, 29 
R-squared for each equation  .86, .80, .71, 
.92, .75, .75 
.88, .76, .78, 
.89, .83, .77 





Table 2, continued 
      
  (4) (5)  (6) 




belief in God 
in some form 
      
log(per capita GDP)  -0.36 (0.18)  -0.36 (0.17)  -0.54 (0.22) 
years of education  0.218 (.040)  0.110 (.036)  0.148 (.046) 
urbanization rate  -2.05 (0.41)  -1.34 (0.34)  -0.67 (0.40) 
log(life expectancy)  4.2 (2.0)  6.5 (1.9)  2.2 (2.3) 
population share ≥ 65  -11.4 (3.8)  -6.9 (3.7)  -10.9 (4.0) 
population share ≤ 15  1.9 (2.5)  2.6 (2.5)  1.3 (2.8) 
religious pluralism  1.23 (0.37)  0.45 (0.32)  -0.11 (0.37) 
state religion  0.80 (0.17)  0.32 (0.16)  0.43 (0.18) 
regulation of religion  -0.11 (0.13)  -0.07 (0.12)  -0.21 (0.13) 
Communist regime  -0.91 (0.24)  -0.96 (0.23)  -1.32 (0.27) 
ex-Communist (in 1995)  0.94 (0.22)  0.44 (0.22)  0.20 (0.32) 
ex-Communist (in 1998)  0.57 (0.17)  0.48 (0.13)  0.41 (0.19) 
ex-Communist (in 1999)  -- --  0.82  (0.25) 
ISSP data  0.35 (0.08)  0.15 (0.08)  0.06 (0.10) 
Gallup data  -- --  -0.57  (0.13) 
Muslim fraction  2.70 (0.38)  0.62 (0.36)  0.26 (0.52) 
Protestant fraction  -1.53 (0.23)  -0.52 (0.22)  -1.27 (0.26) 
Hindu fraction  -1.07 (0.53)  -1.19 (0.50)  -0.97 (0.73) 
eastern religion fraction  -0.75 (0.28)  -0.72 (0.23)  -1.92 (0.28) 
Jewish fraction  -1.80 (0.48)  -1.97 (0.44)  -2.26 (0.55) 
Orthodox fraction  -0.88 (0.30)  -0.58 (0.24)  -0.35 (0.28) 
other religion fraction  1.70 (0.99)  2.10 (0.92)  2.75 (1.20) 
      
number of countries & total observations  50, 129  52, 134  57, 169 
number of observations for each equation  21, 33, 16,  
  30, 29 
26, 33, 16, 
30, 29 
22, 32, 16, 
30, 29, 40 
R-squared for each equation  .75, .74, .71,  
85, .72 
.59, .63, .74, 
.67, .77 
.67, .65, .83, 
.80, .80, .70 
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Notes to Table 2 
 
  Each system, numbered (1)-(6), consists of five or six equations, corresponding to 
observations for countries on the dependent variables at five or six points in time: 1981-
84, subsequently called 1981 (World Values Survey data mostly for 1981, supplemented 
by information from Gallup surveys for a few countries); 1990-93, subsequently called 
1990 (WVS data mostly for 1990, plus observations on some variables for Greece in 1987 
from Eurodim); 1990-93, subsequently called 1991 (International Social Survey 
Programme data mostly for 1991); 1995-97, subsequently called 1995 (WVS data mostly 
for 1995 or 1996); 1998-2000, subsequently called 1998 (ISSP data mostly for 1998); and 
1999 (Gallup Millennium Survey).  The last source has data only for weekly and monthly 
church attendance and belief in god.  The dependent variables are population averages of 
weekly church attendance (1), monthly church attendance (2), belief in heaven (3), belief 
in hell (4), belief in an after-life (5), and belief in God in some form (6).  The measured 
value is either the fraction of people attending or the fraction who hold the belief.  For 
example, in system 2, monthly church attendance is observed for 23 countries with 1981 
data, 37 countries with 1990 data, 22 countries with 1991 data, 32 countries with 1995 
data, 28 countries with 1998 data, and 41 countries with 1999 data.  The form of each 
dependent variable used in the regressions is log[x/(1-x)], where x is the fraction of 
persons attending or believing.  This form confines fitted values of x to the interval [0,1]. 
 
Explanatory variables:  The log of real per capita GDP, average years of 
schooling of adults aged 25 and older, the urbanization rate, the log of life expectancy at 
birth, and the shares of the population aged 65 and over and 15 and under are observed 
just prior to the dependent variable.  For example, 1980 per capita GDP is matched with 
the dependent variables for 1981, 1990 per capita GDP with the dependent variables for 
1990 and 1991, and 1995 per capita GDP with the dependent variables for 1995, 1998, 
and 1999.  The data on these explanatory variables are from a previously assembled 
cross-country data set, which includes information in most cases at five-year intervals.  
Religious pluralism (1 minus the Herfindahl index of religious denomination shares for 
nine categories of religions among those professing some religion) is for 1980 (1990 for 
some Eastern European countries) using data from Barrett (1982) and Barrett, Kurian, 
and Johnson (2001).  The dummy variable for the presence of a state religion (from 
Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson [2001]) applies in 1970.  The dummy variable for state 
regulation of religion (based on whether the state appoints or approves church leaders, 
from Barrett [1982] and Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson [2001]) is for the 1970s.  The 
dummy for the presence of a Communist regime applies to the pre-1990 period.  The 
1995 and later equations also include a dummy for whether the country had been 
Communist but is no longer Communist.  For example, in the 1995 equations, the total 
effect for a former Communist country equals the coefficient on the Communist dummy 
plus the coefficient on the ex-Communist (in 1995) dummy.  The dummy for the use of 
ISSP data applies to the 1991 and 1998 equations and that for Gallup applies to the 1999 
equation.  (These variables allow for the possibility of systematic differences among the 
WVS, ISSP, and Gallup sources.)  The religious denomination variables are the fractions 
professing each religion in 1980 (1990 for some Eastern European countries), according 
to Barrett (1982) and Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001).  The Catholic fraction is  52
omitted as a normalization in each case; hence, the coefficient on each denomination 
represents the differential effect between that denomination and the Catholic one. 
 
Estimation of each system is by the seemingly-unrelated (SUR) method, which 
allows the error terms to be correlated over the time periods for each country.  For 
example, in system 2, the error term for a country’s 1981 monthly church attendance is 
allowed to be correlated with those for 1990, 1991, 1995, 1998, and 1999.  This 
procedure does not weight countries differentially for size or other characteristics.  
Estimated standard errors of the coefficient estimates are shown in parentheses.  Constant 
terms, not shown, are included for each system.  (These vary by system but not across the 
equations within a system.)  The table also shows the number of countries included in 
each equation of a system, the total number of observations, and the number of 
observations and R-squared values for each of the five or six equations of a system.  53
 
Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
   
Variable Mean  Standard  deviation 
   
Weekly church attendance  0.24 0.20 
Monthly church attendance  0.36 0.23 
Belief in heaven  0.55 0.22 
Belief in hell  0.38 0.21 
Belief in after-life  0.58 0.17 
Belief in God in some form  0.80 0.14 
Log[x/(1-x)] for:    
      weekly attendance  -1.53 1.36 
      monthly attendance  -0.74 1.20 
      belief in heaven  0.33 1.16 
      belief in hell  -0.56 1.06 
      belief in after-life  0.35 0.77 
      belief in God  1.75 1.25 
Average “superstition”  0.43 0.14 
Log(per capita GDP)  8.95 0.71 
Years of education  8.29 2.12 
Urbanization rate  0.70 0.15 
Log(life expectancy)  4.290 0.069 
Population share ≥ 65  0.113 0.040 
Population share ≤ 15  0.236 0.071 
Religious pluralism  0.29 0.23 
State religion  0.33 0.47 
Regulation of religion  0.38 0.49 
Communist regime  0.23 0.42 
Catholic fraction  0.47 0.40 
Muslim fraction  0.043 0.148 
Protestant fraction  0.29 0.34 
Hindu fraction  0.012 0.087 
Eastern religion fraction  0.074 0.242 
Jewish fraction  0.010 0.067 
Orthodox fraction  0.073 0.205 
Other religion fraction  0.021 0.062 
 
Note:  The columns show the means and standard deviations of the variables used in the 
statistical analysis of Table 2.  The sample for most variables is the set of observations 
for which data are available for church attendance and the explanatory variables used in 
Table 2.  For the religious belief variables, the set of observations is smaller.  For 
superstition, the values refer to the average of the three indicators shown in Table 6 
(available for 17 countries).  54
 
Table 4  Fitted Values of Monthly Church Attendance for Selected Countries 
            












Monthly attendance 0.58  0.10  0.63  0.91  0.28  0.50 
Log[x/(1-x)] 1.09  -1.42  1.27  3.04  -0.21  0.75 
Residual 0.35  0.23  0.10 0.33 -0.46  -0.15 
Effects of:            
GDP 0.21  0.16  -0.07  -0.39  -0.22  -0.16 
Schooling 0.71  0.24  -0.46 -1.14 -0.28  -0.84 
Urban -0.07 -0.20  -0.04  0.73 0.19  -0.10 
Life expectancy  -0.15 -0.30  0.17  1.24  0.43  0.53 
Pop. ≥ 65  -0.02 -0.12  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.13 
Pop. ≤ 15  -0.08 -0.25  0.67  0.88  0.46  0.50 
Pluralism 0.41  -0.26  -0.29  -0.06 0.45  -0.12 
Communist 0.16  0.16  0.16  0.09  0.16  0.16 
State religion  -0.28 0.57  -0.28  0.57  -0.28  -0.28 
Church regulation  0.22  -0.37  0.22  -0.37  0.22  0.22 
Denominations -0.33 -1.24  0.99  0.99  -0.97  0.89 
 
 
Table 4, continued 
          
















0.88 0.85 0.06 0.29  0.008  0.71 0.85 
Log[x/(1-x)] 2.71 2.46  -2.03  -0.15  -4.08  1.62 2.48 
Residual 0.79  2.05  -1.06  0.97  -1.53  0.40  -0.03 
Effects of:          
GDP  0.04  -0.17 -0.08 -0.03 -0.43  -0.44 -0.39 
Schooling 0.04  0.24  0.42  -0.12  -0.58  -0.88  -1.13 
Urban 0.18  0.11  -0.06  0.10  0.20  0.59  0.50 
Life 
expectancy 
-0.11 0.14 0.27 -0.26  0.27  0.97 0.89 
Pop. ≥ 65  0.00  0.02  0.02  -0.04  0.11  0.13  0.15 
Pop. ≤ 15  0.17  0.07  -0.03  -0.20  0.18  0.57  0.88 
Pluralism  -0.25 -0.13 0.26 -0.30 0.20  0.02 -0.28 
Communist 0.16  -0.59  -0.59  0.16  -0.59  0.16 0.04 
State  religion 0.57 -0.28  -0.28 0.57  -0.28  -0.28 0.57 
Church 
regulation 
0.22 0.22  -0.37  -0.37  -0.37  0.22 0.22 
Denominations 0.94  0.81  -0.50 -0.58 -1.22 0.20  1.10 
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Table 5  Fitted Values of Belief in Heaven for Selected Countries 
            












Belief in heaven  0.87  0.31  0.70  0.98  0.53  0.76 
Log[x/(1-x)] 1.54  -1.13  0.53 3.52 -0.19  0.81 
Residual 0.73  0.10  -0.31  0.53  -0.93  0.67 
Effects of:            
GDP -0.33  -0.25  0.12  0.65  0.38  0.27 
Schooling 0.90  0.32  -0.57  -1.42  -0.34  -1.05 
Urban -0.07  -0.20  -0.03  0.77  0.20  -0.10 
Life expectancy  0.16  0.32  -0.18  -1.32  -0.45  -0.56 
Pop. ≥ 65  -0.09  -0.60  0.72  0.78  0.73  0.68 
Pop. ≤ 15  -0.08  -0.28  0.71  0.94  0.49  0.53 
Pluralism 0.46  -0.27  -0.31  -0.05  0.51  -0.12 
Communist 0.14  0.14  0.14  0.05 0.14  0.14 
State religion  -0.36  0.75  -0.36  0.75  -0.36  -0.36 
Church regulation  0.12  -0.23  0.12  -0.23  0.12  0.12 




Table 5, continued 
      








Belief  in  heaven  0.90 0.80 0.18 0.43 
Log[x/(1-x)] 1.87  1.07  -1.81  -0.59 
Residual 0.23  1.02  -0.74  -0.23 
Effects of:      
GDP  -0.06 0.29 0.15 0.74 
Schooling  0.06 0.32 0.54 -1.09 
Urban 0.20  0.12  -0.06  0.63 
Life  expectancy  0.12 -0.14 -0.29 -1.03 
Pop.  ≥  65  0.01 0.13 0.14 0.68 
Pop. ≤ 15  0.18  0.07  -0.03  0.61 
Pluralism -0.27  -0.13  0.29  0.04 
Communist 0.19  -0.68  -0.68  0.14 
State  religion  0.75 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 
Church regulation  0.12  0.12  -0.23  0.12 
Denominations 0.45  0.37  -0.49  -0.77  56
 
 
Notes to Tables 4 and 5 
 
The value for log[x/(1-x)] in the tables measures x by either the fraction of 
persons attending church at least monthly or the fraction who express belief in heaven.  
The value is expressed relative to the sample mean (where the sample consists of 
observations for which data are available for the variable x and for the explanatory 
variables in the system).  The impact of each of the explanatory variables represents the 
estimated effect on log[x/(1-x)] of the indicated variable, relative to the sample mean 
effect.  For denominations, the value indicates the overall influence, relative to the 
sample mean, from all of the denomination shares.  57
 
Table 6  “Superstition” Variables 
        






        
Canada  0.29 0.36 0.23  0.28 
Philippines  0.32 0.32 0.32  0.32 
Austria  0.32 0.26 0.38  0.33 
France  0.35 0.39 0.41  0.24 
W. Germany  0.36 0.32 0.38  0.38 
Hungary  0.39 0.44 0.40  0.34 
Ireland  0.25 0.30 0.19  0.25 
Portugal  0.34 0.28 0.30  0.45 
Switzerland  0.42 0.40 0.47  0.40 
U.K.  0.32 0.42 0.30  0.24 
New Zealand  0.38 0.46 0.35  0.33 
Bulgaria  0.67 0.65 0.65  0.72 
Czech Rep.  0.58 0.71 0.53  0.50 
Latvia  0.73 0.80 0.66  -- 
Russia  0.60 0.68 0.56  0.57 
Slovak Rep.  0.55 0.68 0.49  0.48 





Note:  The data on belief in fortune tellers, horoscopes, and good-luck charms come from 
the ISSP 1991 and 1998.  The values shown refer to the fraction of the respondents 
believing in each category.  The numbers are averages of the 1991 and 1998 waves if 
both are available.  Otherwise, the value refers to the available wave.  For Latvia, belief 
in good-luck charms is unavailable, and the average of beliefs refers to the other two 
variables. 58
 
Table 7  Correlations among Superstition Variables 
       








1.0 0.90 0.94  0.90 
Fortune 
tellers 
0.90 1.0 0.78  0.66 
Horoscopes 
 
0.94 0.78  1.0  0.82 
Good-luck 
charms 
0.90 0.66 0.82  1.0 
 
Note:  The table shows the correlations of the indicated column and row variables.  The 




Table 8  Correlations for Religion Variables 

















1.0 -0.56 -0.53 -0.63  -0.36  -0.47  -0.56 
Weekly 
attendance 
-0.56 1.0  0.98  0.88 0.80  0.77 0.75 
Monthly 
attendance 
-0.53 0.98  1.0  0.90 0.86 0.85 0.78 
Belief in 
heaven 
-0.63 0.88  0.90  1.0  0.91 0.87 0.92 
Belief in 
hell 
-0.36 0.80  0.86  0.91  1.0 0.82 0.79 
Belief in 
God 
-0.47 0.77  0.85  0.87 0.82 1.0  0.81 
Belief in 
after-life 
-0.56 0.75  0.78  0.92 0.79 0.81  1.0 
 
 
Note:  The table shows the correlations of the indicated column and row variables.  The 
data for the average of the three superstition variables are in Table 6.  The religion 




Table 9  Regressions for Economic Growth 
        













Explanatory  variable:        
Initial log per capita 
GDP and an array of 
other explanatory 
variables are included 
      
Muslim fraction  0.001 
(0.005) 
-- -- -- -- 
Protestant fraction  -0.007 
(0.005) 
-- -- -- -- 
Hindu fraction  -0.013 
(0.012) 
-- -- -- -- 




-- -- -- -- 
Jewish fraction  0.018  
(0.012) 





-- -- -- -- 
Other religion fraction  -0.015 
(0.011) 






















0.10  -- -- -- -- 
Number of countries and 
total observations 
84, 240  39, 117  39, 117  39, 117  39, 117 
Number of observations 

















.41, .58, .47  .49, .71, 
.59 




Table 9, continued 
      













      
Explanatory  variable:      
Initial log per capita GDP 
and an array of 
other explanatory 
variables are included 
    



















Number of countries and 
total observations 
46, 138  46, 138  41, 123  41, 123 





















Notes to Table 9 
 
The dependent variables are the growth rates of per capita real GDP over 1965-
75, 1975-85, and 1985-95.  The explanatory variables that are not shown are the log of 
per capita GDP at the beginning of each period, years of male secondary and higher 
school attainment at the start of each period, the average ratio for each period of exports 
plus imports to GDP (filtered for the usual relation of this ratio to country population and 
area), the average ratio for each period of government consumption (net of outlays on 
defense and education) to GDP, the log of life expectancy at birth at the start of each 
period, the growth rate of the terms of trade over each period, the average of an indicator 
of maintenance of the rule of law (the value for 1982 or 1985 appears in the first two 
equations), the log of the total fertility rate at the start of each period, the consumer price 
inflation rate over each period, and the average ratio over each period of total investment 
to GDP.  For discussion of the data, see Barro (2000).  Estimation is by three-stage least 
squares, using beginning-of-period or lagged values as instruments (except that measures 
of colonial status appear instead of the inflation rate).  Separate constants are estimated 
for each period.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The monthly church attendance and 
belief variables are entered as log[x/(1-x)], where x is the fraction attending or 
believing—see the notes to Table 2.  Column 1 includes in the instrument list the 
denomination fractions (for 1970 in the first two equations and for 1980 or 1990 in the 
third equation).  Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 include the attendance and belief variables in the 
list of instruments.  Columns 3, 5, 7, and 9 use, instead, three variables used as regressors 
in Table 2:  the dummy for the presence of a state religion, the dummy for the existence 
of state regulation of religion, and the pluralism indicator for religious diversity (in 1970 
for the first two equations and in 1980 or 1990 for the third equation).  62
Notes to Figures 
 
In Figures 3-12, which are labeled as “partial relation,” the dependent variable is 
filtered for the estimated effect of each explanatory variable other than the one shown on 
the horizontal axis.  The filtered value is then normalized to have zero mean and is shown 
in relation to the selected explanatory variable.  The same procedure applies to the 
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